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Article
Broad personality traits such as extraversion and neuroticism 
have been shown to influence the expression and interpreta-
tion of facial expressions of emotions and display rules (e.g., 
Fok, Hui, Bond, Matsumoto, & Yoo, 2008; Riggio & Riggio, 
2002; Rogers & Revelle, 1998). For example, extraverts 
habitually display smiling and laughter more intensely and 
more often compared to introverts (Ruch, 2005; see also 
Hofmann, Platt, Ruch, Niewiadomski, & Urbain, 2015). 
Extraverts also tend to lessen the expressive control over joy, 
while increasing the expressive control over contempt (Fok 
et al., 2008). Within the extraversion–neuroticism quadrant, 
one stable inter-individual differences variable is known to 
account for biases in the processing of joy, humor, and laugh-
ter: gelotophobia (the fear of being laughed at; Ruch & 
Proyer, 2008a).
Individuals with gelotophobia describe themselves pri-
marily as introvert-neurotics (Ruch & Proyer, 2009). They 
express less smiling and laughter (Platt, Hofmann, Ruch, & 
Proyer, 2013; Ruch, Hofmann, & Platt, 2015), report experi-
encing less joy in a variety of situations (see Ruch, Hofmann, 
Platt, & Proyer, 2014 for a review), and others’ positive 
laughter is experienced as malicious (Ruch, Altfreder, & 
Proyer, 2009). Also, they respond with a marked heart rate 
deceleration toward hearing laughter (indicating a “freezing-
like” response; Papousek et al., 2014). Gelotophobes inter-
pret laughter as a weapon utilized for putting them down and 
falsely attribute it to mockery directed toward them (Ruch & 
Proyer, 2008b). Consequently, they respond fearfully to 
benevolent laughter (Ruch & Proyer, 2009), implying a pos-
sible bias in interpreting joy and emotions potentially going 
along with laughter/ridicule (i.e., contempt).
Thus, while extraversion and neuroticism partially predict 
responses toward joy and contempt, gelotophobia is a specific 
trait that biases joy responses and their interpretation (see Ruch 
et al., 2014). As gelotophobia goes beyond global personality 
dimensions and is also sufficiently different from lower order 
concepts such as shame-proneness, timidity, and social anxiety 
(Ruch et al., 2014), it is necessary to investigate its relation to 
responses and interpretation of joy and contempt smiles. 
Therefore, the present research investigated how individuals 
with or without gelotophobia respond toward facially expressed 
types of smiles (with a special focus on smiles of joy and con-
tempt). This is important, as a bias in perceiving smiles and 
laughs might lead to important consequences in social interac-
tions (see Fredrickson, 1998; Johnston, Miles, & Macrae, 
2010; Papa & Bonanno, 2008). It is expected that gelotophobes 
have a specific bias in interpreting facially expressed smiling 
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Abstract
In a paradigm facilitating smile misattribution, facial responses and ratings to contempt and joy were investigated in individuals 
with or without gelotophobia (fear of being laughed at). Participants from two independent samples (N
1
 = 83, N
2
 = 50) rated 
the intensity of eight emotions in 16 photos depicting joy, contempt, and different smiles. Facial responses were coded by 
the Facial Action Coding System in the second study. Compared with non-fearful individuals, gelotophobes rated joy smiles 
as less joyful and more contemptuous. Moreover, gelotophobes showed less facial joy and more contempt markers. The 
contempt ratings were comparable between the two groups. Looking at the photos of smiles lifted the positive mood of non-
gelotophobes, whereas gelotophobes did not experience an increase. We hypothesize that the interpretation bias of “joyful 
faces hiding evil minds” (i.e., being also contemptuous) and exhibiting less joy facially may complicate social interactions for 
gelotophobes and serve as a maintaining factor of gelotophobia.
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and laughter, as those displays are linked to being laughed at 
(or misattributed ridicule).
The perception of being laughed at may go along with at 
least two kinds of laughs and feeling states. First, amused 
laughter (equivalent to joyful laughter in its expression; see 
Ruch & Ekman, 2001) occurs, when mirthful people are 
amused about something or someone, while the “target” is 
excluded from the joke, that is, because he or she does not 
get the punch line or does not have the in-group knowledge 
to understand the joke. This could consequently be misper-
ceived as ridicule, though this is not directly laughing at, but 
the others are not laughing with the person. In line with this, 
Ruch et al. (2009) demonstrated that auditory-presented 
laughs of a positive quality were misperceived by geloto-
phobes. Joyful laughs where perceived as more malicious by 
gelotophobes than individuals with no fear, and listening to 
the laughter did not lift the cheerful mood from pre to post 
the task. Thus, we expect that gelotophobes misinterpret joy-
ful laughter as contemptuous, as those displays of joy are 
misinterpreted as laughing at, while individuals with no fear 
distinguish between joy smiles and contempt displays.
Second, contemptuous laughter occurs when people are 
laughing at somebody else maliciously (as a form of aggres-
sion; Poyatos, 1993). Typically, this would elicit negative 
emotions in the person being laughed at (e.g., shame or 
anger; Papousek et al., 2014). We expect that expressions of 
contemptuous laughter are perceived as such by individuals 
with no fear of being laughed at and gelotophobes (i.e., con-
taining contempt), but we also expect that gelotophobes 
assign those displays more joy, as they infer that people 
enjoy laughing at them (see Ruch & Proyer, 2008a).
Aims of the Present Study
For an empirical test of the hypotheses on joy and contempt 
smiles, photos of facially expressed joy and contempt smiles, 
as well as expressions of emotions, ambiguous expressions, 
and other kinds of smiles were studied (based on the works 
of Bänninger-Huber, 1996; Ekman, 1985).1 By adding fur-
ther smiles and emotion expressions beyond joyful and con-
temptuous smiles,2 it could be tested whether the 
gelotophobes’ bias in the perception is specific to joy and 
contempt and not a general inability to judging smiles and 
emotion expressions. The basic emotion and ambiguous 
expressions were included to conceal the main aim of the 
study. Two studies were conducted to investigate responses 
(verbal ratings of emotions and facial responses) toward 
facially expressed smiles and laughs in individuals with and 
without gelotophobia.
In Study 1, ratings of nine emotions toward photos of joy 
and contempt smiles, and other smile types were investi-
gated. The hypotheses stated that gelotophobes misperceive 
the joy smile and rate the perceived joy lower than the no 
fear group, while individuals with no fear of being laughed at 
would assign joy (and only joy) to photos of joy smiles 
(H1a). Also, it was assumed that gelotophobes perceive joy 
smiles as more contemptuous (due to their anticipation of 
ridicule; H1b). For contempt displays, it was expected that 
gelotophobes would rate contempt high, like individuals 
with no fear (H2a). Moreover, gelotophobes would differ 
from individuals without gelotophobia by rating joy higher, 
as they attribute others to gain enjoyment from ridicule 
(H2b). For the rating of other expressions (basic emotions, 
smiles, ambiguous expressions), it was expected that indi-
viduals with no fear and gelotophobes would not differ in the 
emotion assignment, as gelotophobes do not generally lack 
the ability to rate facial expressions of others (see also 
Papousek et al., 2009), but have a specific bias in joy and 
contempt.
Study 2 included the rating of photos of joy and contempt 
in a laboratory setting where also the participants’ facial 
responses were filmed and coded by the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS; Ekman, Friesen, & Hager, 2002), 
giving insight into the facial responses toward joy and con-
tempt. Studies have shown that facial mimicry of smiling 
increases the correct interpretation of smiles (e.g., Maringer, 
Krumhuber, Fischer, & Niedenthal, 2011). As gelotophobes 
have been shown to express joy less frequently and less 
intensely (Platt et al., 2013), it was assumed that they show 
less frequent joy responses toward photos of joy smiles (H3). 
Also, it was expected that they show more contempt 
responses toward joy smile photos, as they misattribute joy 
smiles to being contemptuous and respond accordingly (H4). 
Also, gelotophobes were expected to show more contempt 
responses toward contempt expressions (compared with 
individuals without gelotophobia), as they are more sensitive 
to perceiving this emotion (H5). Beyond the methods uti-
lized in Study 1, Study 2 further accounted for trait positive 
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) to control for any habit-
ual tendency to rate positive emotions lower in low-trait PA 
or to rate negative emotions higher in high-trait NA. This 
was important because gelotophobia has been shown to go 
along with lower levels of joy on a state and trait level (Ruch 
et al., 2014). Participants’ mood scores before and after the 
experimental task were evaluated. It was expected that by 
engaging with social stimuli entailing smiling and laughter, 
the mood of non-fearful individuals would lift, while geloto-
phobes would not experience the same increase (H6).
Study 1
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 83 adult volunteers (68 
females, 15 males, age range = 18-62, M = 33.06, SD = 
11.72). The fear group consisted of 15 participants exceeding 
the empirically derived cut-off point for gelotophobia at 2.50 
(see Ruch & Proyer, 2008b; M = 2.85, SD = 0.29, minimum 
= 2.53, maximum = 3.53; three males, 12 females). Of the 
15, 10 were classified as slight, 4 as marked, and 1 as 
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extremely fearful of being laughed at. The no fear group’s 
gelotophobia scores had a mean of 1.54 (SD = 0.26, mini-
mum = 1.07, maximum = 1.93) and consisted of 68 partici-
pants (age = 18-62, M = 33.24, SD = 11.98; excluding 
individuals with borderline gelotophobia n = 32; valued 
between 2.00 and 2.49 on the GELOPH<15>; 12 males, 56 
females). The gelotophobia mean of the no fear group was 
lower than the mean of the gelotophobes, F(1, 82) = 287.68, 
p< .001, ηp2  = .78.
Instruments. The GELOPH<15> (Ruch & Proyer, 2008b) is 
a 15-item standard measure for the subjective assessment of 
gelotophobia (“when others laugh in my presence I get suspi-
cious”). All items are positively keyed and utilize a 4-point 
answer scale (1 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly agree). 
Internal consistency was high (α = .86) in the present sample. 
Ruch and Proyer (2008b) derived empirical cut-off points for 
slight gelotophobia (2.50-2.99), marked gelotophobia (3.00-
3.49), and extreme fear of being laughed at (3.50-4.00).
The smiling face may hide an evil mind paradigm. This para-
digm was developed to assess individuals’ perceptions of joy 
and contempt smiles. First, participants were given the cover 
story that lay actors were asked to pose certain facial expres-
sions while being in different states of mind. In detail, the 
participants were told that the presenters had undergone the 
task of getting into one of three predefined frames of mind 
(mean-spirited, neutral, benevolent) and then displaying cer-
tain facial configurations of emotions (e.g., joy, fear, sur-
prise) that they had practiced before. The participants were 
made aware that the emotional state a presenter displays may 
(but also may not) match the frame of mind the presenter was 
in. The instruction, thus, facilitated gelotophobia by activat-
ing the notion that the actor might be concealing their true 
emotional state when displaying facial expressions. Second, 
a selection of 16 photos was then rated for their emotion 
content.
The 16 photos contained expressions of joy smiles, con-
tempt smiles, other smile types (phony smiles, “Chaplin,” 
masking smiles) based on the work of Bänninger-Huber 
(1996) and Ekman (1985), as well as distractor stimuli (sur-
prise, a happy–surprise blend, a photo of “beginning of fear,” 
“concentration,” and two photos with no facial action unit 
[AU; Ekman et al., 2002] present). The latter ambiguous 
emotion expressions were considered “noisy” stimuli and 
served as distractor stimuli. They facilitated the interpreta-
tion of the frame of mind of the presenter diverging from the 
emotion displayed, as the face contained ambiguous infor-
mation. Those photos of ambiguous emotion displays needed 
to be included to make the cover story plausible by implying 
that the presenters might “leak” their true frame of mind and 
to distract from the stimuli of interest, the joy and contempt 
smiles (and counteracting any hypotheses building by the 
participant). The photos included five presenters of both gen-
ders and were shown individually on a 21-inch computer 
screen, head and shoulder close-up view. The participants 
rated the perceived intensity of eight emotions to the photo 
(anger, contempt, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, shame, surprise) 
on a 6-point scale (1 = not at all, 6 = a lot).
Procedure
Generation of the photos. Five FACS-trained presenters 
(two males) posed the 16 different smiles, basic emotions, 
and ambiguous expressions that were finally selected for the 
experiment. The pool of photos was coded with the FACS 
(Ekman et al., 2002) by two trained FACS coders to ensure 
the convergence between the intended and expressed display. 
Three photos were joy smiles in different intensities (Duch-
enne displays [DDs], two times AU6 + 7 + 12; 6 + 12 + 25 
+ 263; open mouth implied laughing), three contempt smiles 
(AUR14; L6 + L14; 14), two masking smiles (AU6 + 7 + 12 
+ 17 + 24; 6 + 12 + 24), one phony (AU12) and “Chaplin 
smile” (AU13) each. The distractor stimuli consisted of one 
photo for surprise (AU1 + 2), happy surprise (AU1 + 2 + 6 
+ 12 + 25), beginning of fear (AU20), beginning of anger/
concentration (AU7), and two neutral photos with no AUs 
present.
Study procedure. Participants were recruited through a 
newspaper article, which contained a link to the study web-
site, announcing for a study in personality psychology. On 
the study website, participants were first asked to fill in the 
GELOPH<15>, and then asked to complete a “rating task on 
judging faces” (Smiling Face May Hide an Evil Mind Para-
digm). To end the session, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. All participants participated 
voluntarily, and individual feedback on selected personality 
variables was offered as incentive.
Data analysis strategy. In this quasi-experimental study, 
the level of gelotophobia group (gelotophobia vs. no fear) 
was the independent variable and the emotion ratings were 
the dependent variables. Aggregated scores for emotion rat-
ings of photos with the same content (e.g., all joy smiles) 
were computed, leading to one composite score for each 
emotion rating for the three DDs, one for the three con-
tempt displays, and one score for the two masking smiles. 
The other smiles were analyzed individually. Photos of basic 
emotions and ambiguous expressions were used as distrac-
tor items.4 The following analysis strategies were applied for 
hypotheses testing: First, for displays with a target emotion 
(i.e., joy and contempt), it was of interest whether the tar-
get emotion (i.e., the emotion displayed, for example, joy 
for DDs) would be highest for the respective stimuli. For 
this, contrasts of the target emotion against the other relevant 
emotions (if any) were computed. An empirical cut-off point 
for “relevant emotions” was established. Only emotions with 
an overall mean rating indicating at least “slight presence of 
the emotion” were considered (i.e., overall mean of at least 
2.00). Those are reported in each respective section of the 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Emotion Ratings Toward the 
Photographs (Study 1, N = 83).
No fear Gelotophobia
Type of photo Emotion M SD M SD
Joy smile Anger 1.30 0.46 1.89 1.06
 Contempt 1.50 0.67 2.16 1.29
 Disgust 1.34 0.64 1.53 0.79
 Fear 1.34 0.44 1.53 0.60
 Joy 5.06 1.15 4.73 1.41
 Sadness 1.30 0.54 1.36 0.62
 Shame 1.75 0.98 1.81 0.81
 Surprise 1.82 0.96 1.82 0.87
Contempt Anger 2.61 1.08 2.48 1.24
 Contempt 2.47 1.09 2.62 1.21
 Disgust 1.63 0.71 1.93 0.87
 Fear 1.56 0.65 1.69 0.61
 Joy 2.40 1.11 2.88 1.02
 Sadness 1.79 0.89 1.73 1.00
 Shame 1.78 0.80 2.02 1.03
 Surprise 1.70 0.89 1.96 1.03
Phony smile Anger 1.54 1.04 1.87 1.36
 Contempt 1.67 1.25 1.87 1.51
 Disgust 1.57 1.25 1.60 0.99
 Fear 1.62 1.04 2.07 1.39
 Joy 4.02 1.79 3.50 1.56
 Sadness 1.35 0.79 1.80 1.37
 Shame 1.94 1.24 2.00 1.11
 Surprise 1.94 1.31 1.47 0.83
Masking smile Anger 1.40 0.64 1.87 1.38
 Contempt 1.57 0.81 1.50 1.12
 Disgust 1.33 0.79 1.63 1.06
 Fear 1.43 0.75 2.00 1.30
 Joy 4.43 1.54 3.89 1.71
 Sadness 1.24 0.50 1.60 0.87
 Shame 2.57 1.54 3.07 1.22
 Surprise 2.29 1.38 2.40 1.78
Chaplin smile Anger 3.13 1.84 3.21 2.08
 Contempt 2.43 1.68 3.13 1.81
 Disgust 2.60 1.75 3.00 2.10
 Fear 3.29 1.85 3.13 1.85
 Joy 1.79 1.18 2.33 1.29
 Sadness 1.80 1.17 2.00 1.46
 Shame 2.72 1.86 2.60 1.80
 Surprise 2.46 1.66 2.53 1.81
Note. . No fear = low gelotophobia scores, <2.0 on the GELOPH<15> 
(Ruch & Proyer, 2008b). Gelotophobia = gelotophobia scores > 2.5 on 
the GELOPH<15>.
analysis. The consideration of emotions that were at least 
slightly present allowed for targeted testing of group differ-
ences in relevant ratings (and not comparing the groups on 
ratings which were not chosen to be relevant). Second, group 
differences (no fear vs. gelotophobia) were investigated for 
the target emotion. Third, it was of interest whether other 
emotions were assigned in the rating (with a special focus 
on group differences). Differences were investigated with 
repeated-measures ANOVAs (gelotophobia group as inde-
pendent, intensity of emotion as dependent, and the emotions 
above the cut-off as repeated-measures factors; in the fol-
lowing only referred to as repeated-measures ANOVA). The 
main focus lay in the analysis of joy, contempt, and variants 
of smiles.
Results
Joy smiles. The aggregated ratings of the three joy smiles 
were evaluated for the intensity of the target emotion joy. 
Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows that joy had the highest mean rating across 
all eight emotions, and only the contempt rating exceeded 
the cut-off in the group of gelotophobes. As expected, a con-
trast comparing joy against contempt showed that joy was 
rated more intense than contempt in both groups, F(1, 79) = 
202.49, p< .001, ηp2  = .72. In line with the expectations, the 
interaction between the type of emotion and gelotophobia 
group, F(1, 79) = 5.39, p< .05, ηp2  = .06, showed that geloto-
phobes rated joy lower than the no fear group; F(1, 80) = 
4.29, p< .05, ηp2  = .05, confirming H1a. Contempt toward 
the joy photos was rated higher in gelotophobes than in the 
no fear group, confirming H1b; F(1, 80) = 8.16, p< .01, 
ηp2  = .07.
Contempt smiles. Contempt, joy, and anger were analyzed 
(they exceeded the cut-off). The intensity of the contempt 
rating was compared to the other two emotions, showing that 
contempt did not differ from the rating of anger, but both 
were higher than the ratings of joy, Femotion(2, 162) = 9.16, p< 
.001, ηp2  = .10; Fcontrast(1, 81) = 14.37, p< .001, ηp
2  = .15. 
Contrary to the expectation, the interaction (Emotion × Gelo-
tophobia group) was not significant, F(2, 226) = 1.17, p = 
.354. This disconfirmed H2a. Still, in line with the expecta-
tions, gelotophobes rated contempt numerically more intense 
than the no fear group. Also joy was rated numerically more 
intense in gelotophobes than in the no fear group (in the 
direction of H2b), and the fearful individuals rated anger less 
intense. Nevertheless, the results failed to reach statistical 
significance, disconfirming H2a and H2b.
Phony, masking, and Chaplin smiles. In the phony smile, joy 
and contempt exceeded the cut-off. The ANOVA showed no 
group differences for the level of gelotophobia, F(1, 72) = 
0.29, p = .586, occurred. As the masking smiles and the 
Chaplin smile had no a priori emotion assignment, they were 
analyzed for differences between the two groups in the emo-
tions being at least slightly present. For ratings of masking 
smiles, joy, shame, and surprise exceeded the cut-off. The 
repeated-measures ANOVA showed that the emotion ratings 
differed from each other, with joy being the highest, 
F(2, 146) = 46.08, p< .001, ηp2  = .39, but the interaction level 
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of Gelotophobia group × Emotion was not significant, 
F(2, 146) = 2.19, p = .116, and neither was the effect for the 
level of gelotophobia, F(1, 73) = 0.01, p = .984. For the 
Chaplin smile, the anger, fear, shame, disgust, contempt, and 
surprise ratings exceeded the cut-off point, but did not differ 
in intensity, F(5, 395) = 2.18, p = .063, and no group differ-
ence, F(1, 79) = 0.27, p = .681, nor interaction occurred, F(5, 
395) = 0.29, p = .919.
Discussion
Our results showed that gelotophobia biases the judgment of 
facially displayed joy smiles (and laughs). While individuals 
with no fear of being laughed at related only joy to the photos 
of joy smiles, gelotophobes responded to these joy smiles by 
assigning less joy and more contempt compared with indi-
viduals with no fear (H1a, H1b). This was in line with the 
expectation that gelotophobes misperceive the genuine 
expression of joy by assuming that the person is ridiculing 
them and hiding an “evil mind.” Already Hobbes (1651/2010) 
related contempt to laughter and ridicule, and Darwin (1872) 
claimed,
 . . . in the case of derision, a real or pretended smile or laugh is 
often blended with the expression proper to contempt, and this 
may pass into angry contempt or scorn. In such cases the 
meaning of the laugh or smile is to show the offending person 
that he or she excites only amusement. (p. 224)
The expectations that contempt smiles are perceived as 
more joyful, as well as containing more contempt for gelo-
tophobes compared with individuals with no fear failed to 
reach statistical significance (H2a and H2b were discon-
firmed). Thus, the current result replicated the finding of 
Ruch et al. (2009), who found that gelotophobes and indi-
viduals with no fear did not differ in judging negative audi-
tory laughter. To conclude, the bias of gelotophobes to 
assign more contempt to smiles was specific to genuine 
enjoyment displays, as no differences were found for other 
smiles. This is the first study to reveal contempt as a rele-
vant emotion in gelotophobia, and a further assessment of 
emotion displays needs to verify the findings in an indepen-
dent sample (by also controlling for trait PA and NA, and 
mood).
Study 2
Study 2 included the decoding of the 16 photos in the 
“Smiling Face May Hide an Evil Mind Paradigm” in a labo-
ratory setting. A sample of independently collected partici-
pants rated the same photos, and their facial responses were 
filmed and coded by the FACS, giving further insight into the 
responses toward joy and contempt. Also, trait PA and NA 
and mood changes pre and post the task were assessed.
Method
Participants. The sample consisted of 50 adults (38 females, 
12 males; age range = 18-72 years, M = 39.76, SD = 15.19). 
The fear group consisted of 25 adults (eight males; age range 
= 18-72 years, Mdn = 38 years) that exceeded the cut-off 
score for gelotophobia in an online screening (that led to 
invitations to an experiment), as well as at the beginning of 
the experiment. The double check helped make sure that the 
participants had at least a slight fear of being laughed at. Of 
the 25, 11 were classified as slight, 12 as marked, and 3 as 
extremely fearful of being laughed at. None of them were 
enrolled in therapeutic treatment or consumed psychotropic 
medication at the time of the experiment. The no fear group 
was formed of 25 participants (4 males; age range = 20-68 
years, Mdn = 44 years) that reported no gelotophobia (M = 
1.79, SD = 0.40). Their GELOPH<15> scores were lower 
than the ones of the fear group (M = 3.00, SD = 0.24), 
F(1, 49) = 167.20, p< .001, ηp2  = .78.
Instruments. The GELOPH<15> (Ruch & Proyer, 2008b), as 
described in Study 1, was applied to assess the individual 
differences in gelotophobia. Cronbach’s alpha was high 
(α = .90).
The Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) assesses the 
independent dimensions of PA and NA with 20 items on a 
5-point scale (1 = not at all to 5 = very much). In this study, 
PA and NA as traits and states’ reliabilities (internal consis-
tency) were higherthan ≥.85.
The smiling face may hide an evil mind paradigm. The 16 pho-
tos of Study 1 were used, but the analyses focused on joy and 
contempt smiles only. All other photos were used as distrac-
tor items in the assessment (and to ensure the comparability 
of the design with Study 1) but not evaluated. Converging 
with Study 1, photos with the same content were aggregated 
to composite scores for each emotion rating.
Facial measurements. The FACS (Ekman et al., 2002) is an 
anatomically based, comprehensive, objective technique 
for measuring all observable facial movements. It distin-
guishes 44 AUs. These are the minimal units that are visu-
ally distinguishable. FACS allows for measurement of the 
frequency and intensity of a facial movement. The intensi-
ties range from trace (coded A) to maximum (E; Ekman 
et al., 2002).
Procedure. Participants were recruited through newspaper 
articles, which contained a link to the study website. The 
website provided information on the procedure and the GEL-
OPH<15>. Participants could leave their email address when 
interested in coming to the laboratory for a single session. 
When doing so, participants were sent a link to an online 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Trait Variables and 
Emotion Ratings (Study 2; N = 50).
No fear Gelotophobia
 M SD M SD
PA trait 3.80 0.61 2.70 0.80
NA trait 1.79 0.63 2.53 0.70
PA before 3.48 0.62 3.11 0.78
NA before 1.16 0.26 1.80 0.62
PA after 3.79 0.74 2.92 0.94
NA after 1.05 0.10 1.64 0.80
Joy smiles
 Anger 1.36 0.57 1.73 0.88
 Contempt 1.67 0.65 2.72 0.92
 Disgust 1.19 0.35 1.63 0.71
 Fear 1.28 0.48 1.36 0.54
 Joy 4.81 0.57 2.49 0.65
 Sadness 1.26 0.41 1.40 0.65
 Shame 1.50 0.69 1.76 0.95
 Surprise 2.00 1.22 1.84 1.02
Contempt
 Anger 2.99 0.87 2.69 0.95
 Contempt 3.28 1.02 3.31 1.31
 Disgust 1.65 0.54 2.09 1.09
 Fear 1.74 0.85 1.83 0.76
 Joy 1.74 0.61 2.11 0.87
 Sadness 1.54 0.71 1.83 0.96
 Shame 1.56 0.57 1.73 0.77
 Surprise 2.44 1.00 2.37 1.04
Note. No fear = low gelotophobia scores (n = 25). Gelotophobia = 
gelotophobia scores > 2.5 (n = 25). PA = positive affect; NA = negative 
affect.
calendar, where they could choose a date and were given a 
personalized login to a website. On the website, they com-
pleted the PANAS trait and the GELOPH<15> (for the sec-
ond time). At the beginning of the study session, the 
participants were asked to complete the PANAS state. Then, 
participants were left to read the instructions and to complete 
the task on the computer. All participants completed the eight 
emotion ratings to an example photo. If the task was unclear, 
they had the opportunity to ask the experimenter for explana-
tions. The cover story and presentation of the 16 photos, as 
well as the ratings, were the same as in Study 1. Participants 
completed the task in solitude with the experimenter waiting 
in an adjacent room. During the task, a computer-inbuilt 
camera unobtrusively videotaped the participant’s face. 
Afterward, participants filled in the PANAS state measure 
again. To end the session, participants were debriefed and 
informed about the filming. No participants took the offer to 
have the video material deleted. Written consent allowed the 
use of the material that was collected. On average, the exper-
imental session lasted 45 minutes. All participants attended 
voluntarily, and a personal feedback on the trait measures 
was offered. Procedures and interactions were standardized, 
and consent was obtained from the local ethic committee.
Facial action coding. Measurements provided full color, 
digital format films, which gave a close-up, head-on view 
of the participants’ face. The facial responses toward pho-
tos were assessed using the FACS. Two FACS-certified 
researchers followed a designated procedure to scoring the 
AUs relevant for joy smiles (DDs; Ekman, Davidson, & 
Friesen, 1990), contempt, and masking smiles. The inter-
rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) for the two coders was K 
= .88. Facial variables were formed for responses to each 
photo separately. Presence of a DD and its intensity was 
coded, defined by the symmetric and simultaneous presence 
of AU12 + 6. It may be accompanied by a tightening of the 
eyelids (AU7) and/or mouth opening (AU25, 26, 27), but no 
other AU. Intensity of DDs was based on the peak intensity 
of the AU12. Contempt smiles (unilateral AU14) were coded 
in both frequency and intensity. Masking smiles were coded 
as AU12 plus markers of any of five negative emotions (sad-
ness, anger, fear, disgust, contempt; see Bänninger-Huber, 
1996; Ekman & Friesen, 1982).
Results
Differences in the level of gelotophobia in trait PA and NA. Means 
and standard deviations of PA and NA are reported in Table 
2. Univariate ANOVAs with the level of gelotophobia (gelo-
tophobia, no fear) as independent and the respective trait as 
dependent variable showed that the gelotophobes reported 
less PA compared with the no fear group, F(1, 49) = 5.52, p< 
.05, ηp2  = .10, and more NA compared with the non-fearful 
individuals, F(1, 49) = 4.28, p< .05, ηp2  = .08.
Emotion ratings toward joy and contempt smile photos. Descrip-
tive statistics for the emotion ratings toward the photos were 
computed (see Table 2). Only photos containing joy and con-
tempt smiles were evaluated to replicate the findings of 
Study 1.
Table 2 shows ratings for each emotion, but only ratings 
that exceeded the cut-off point of being at least slightly pres-
ent were utilized. The cut-off point was equivalent to Study 
1 and ensured that only emotions were considered for analy-
ses that were empirically relevant. Table 2 shows that the 
ratings of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1, with compara-
ble means and standard deviations. Next, joy and contempt 
smile photos were analyzed for the emotions rated and group 
differences (level of gelotophobia; gelotophobia vs. no fear).
Joy smiles. For the joy smile photos, the intensity of the 
target emotion joy was compared with the only other emotion 
exceeding the overall cut-off, contempt. A repeated-measures 
ANCOVA with gelotophobia group as independent, intensity 
of rated emotion as dependent variable, PA and NA as covari-
ates, and the two emotions as the repeated-measures factor 
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was computed. PA and NA were added to control for effects 
of habitual tendencies to positive and negative emotions, 
which might influence the emotion ratings. Results indicated 
a significant main effect for the factor Emotion Type (joy and 
contempt), F(1, 44) = 57.77, p< .001, ηp2  = .57. The interac-
tion, F(1, 44) = 18.98, p< .001, ηp2  = .30, showed that the 
gelotophobes rated joy lower than the no fear group, in line 
with H1a, F(3, 48) = 22.09, p< .001, ηp2  = .60, and contempt 
higher than the no fear group, meeting the expectations of 
H1b, F(3, 48) = 8.34, p< .001, ηp2  = .36. With respect to the 
influences of PA and NA, both interactions of the Type of 
Emotion × PA, F(1, 44) = 1.54, p = .221, and NA, F(1, 44) = 
1.35, p = .251, were not significant, indicating that the effect 
existed independent of PA and NA, respectively. Therefore, 
these traits were not controlled for in further analyses.
Contempt smiles. Contempt, surprise, and anger were ana-
lyzed. A repeated-measures ANOVA (gelotophobia group as 
independent, intensity as dependent variable, emotions as 
repeated measures) was computed. First, a contrast showed 
that the contempt ratings differed from both surprise and 
anger, F(2, 46) = 10.69, p< .001, ηp2  = .32; F
contrast
(1, 47) 
= 19.81, p< .001, ηp2  = .30. No interaction occurred, show-
ing that both groups perceived contempt to equal extents 
(ns, disconfirming H2a).5 Next, the joy rating was tested for 
group differences as it was hypothesized that gelotophobes 
would attribute joy to contempt smiles and Study 1 revealed 
a numerical difference in the expected direction of H2b. The 
gelotophobes showed a tendency to rate joy more intense 
than the no fear group, F(1, 48) = 3.04, p< .05, one-tailed, 
ηp2  = .07.
Facial responses towards the photos
Overview. Aggregated scores for the frequency of the 
DDs, contempt smiles, and masking smiles6 towards all 
16 photos, as well as scores for responses towards photos 
showing DDs and contempt smiles, were computed. Non- 
parametric analyses were applied for the data on types of 
photos as criteria for normal distribution were violated.
Convergence of facial expressions displayed to differ-
ent smiles. It was evaluated whether appropriate mimicry 
occurred toward the emotion displayed on the photos (e.g., 
DDs mimicked by DDs). A non-parametric-related sample 
Friedman’s two-way ANOVA was used to compare the facial 
responses toward the DDs. Only the no fear group was con-
sidered for analysis, as a priori assumptions implied that 
the gelotophobes respond with less, and also counter-mim-
icry (i.e., facial expressions contrary to those shown in the 
photo; see Lanzetta & Orr, 1986). Thus, to confirm that the 
approach is suitable to induce convergent facial responses 
in participants without specific fears, all individuals without 
gelotophobia were chosen for an investigation of the mim-
icry toward the photos. The differences for the frequency of 
DDs (dependent variable) to joy photos and contempt photos 
(repeated measures) were computed. The results yielded a 
significant main effect, χ2(df = 1) = 10.89, p< .001, showing 
that the facial mimicry toward DDs differed. Wilcoxon rank-
order comparisons showed that more DDs occurred toward 
joy photos, differing from contempt smile photos (p< .001). 
For the expression of contempt smiles, it was also shown that 
the facial expressions toward the two types of photos (joy 
smiles, contempt smiles) differed, χ2(df = 1) = 4.46, p< .05. 
The post hoc Wilcoxon rank-order comparisons showed that 
contempt was displayed most frequently toward contempt 
photos, differing from joy displays (p< .05).
Differences in level of gelotophobia in overall frequencies of 
facial displays. The frequency of all facial responses over the 
16 photos ranged between 0 and 14 (M = 4.46, SD = 2.54), 
implying that some participants did not show any displays of 
DDs or contempt smiles, whereas others responded with one 
of those facial events to 87.5% of the photos. More specifi-
cally, the occurrence of DDs over all 16 photos ranged from 
0 to 7 (M = 1.58, SD = 2.02), and contempt ranged from 0 
to 8 (M = 2.58, SD = 1.94). No photo elicited more than one 
facial response. A repeated-measures ANOVA was computed 
to reveal general differences in the frequency of joy and con-
tempt shown by the two groups (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 shows that with respect to the total frequency of 
DDs (joy smiles), the no fear group exhibited more DDs than 
the gelotophobes, Ffacial display(1, 48) = 7.99, p< .01, ηp
2  = .14; 
Finteraction(1, 48) = 56.24, p< .001, ηp
2  = .54; Fjoy(1, 49) = 
46.36, p< .001, ηp2  = .49, while contempt was elicited more 
frequently in gelotophobes in comparison with the no fear 
group, F(1, 49) = 9.29, p< .01, ηp2  = .16, in line with the 
expectations.
Figure 1. Frequency of joy (DD) and contempt smiles expressed 
toward all 16 photos by gelotophobes (fear group) and individuals 
without gelotophobia (no fear).
Note. DD = Duchenne display.
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Group differences in facial expressions displays to differ-
ent types of smiles. Next, it was evaluated whether the two 
groups differed in the facial expressions shown toward one 
type of emotion displayed in the photos. χ2 tests comparing 
the frequency of occurrence of two types of facial responses 
(DD, contempt smile) with two types of smiles (joy and 
contempt) presented in photos were computed. First, the no 
fear group’s frequency of mimicked DD responses toward 
joy photos was higher than that in the gelotophobia group, 
in line with H3, χ2(df = 1) = 23.27, p< .001. For joy smiles 
toward photos entailing contempt, the assumption of having 
at least five cases in each cell was violated. Second, the gelo-
tophobes differed from the no fear group in the frequency of 
showing contempt in response to the joy smile photos, with 
gelotophobes showing higher numbers of contempt smiles, 
in line with H4, χ2(df = 1) = 10.27, p< .001. In respect to 
contempt smiles toward contempt photos, the gelotophobes 
did not differ from the no fear group in the frequency of 
responses, χ2(df = 1) = 0.32, p = .571 (disconfirming H5).
Convergence of subjective and objective data. The conver-
gence between verbal emotion ratings and facial responses 
was examined by Spearman’s rank-order correlations. 
Higher ratings of joy toward joy photos went along with 
more intense DDs (r = .54, p< .01). Also, higher joy ratings 
toward joy photos went along with less expressed contempt 
(r = −.44, p< .01). Contempt ratings toward joy photos went 
along with less intense responses of DDs (r = −.37, p< .01) 
and more expressed contempt (r = .19, p = .19), showing 
moderate convergence of objective and subjective data.
Participants’ mood. Means and standard deviations of PA and 
NA are reported in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of the 
state scales indicated high skewness values for NA (i.e., gen-
erally low levels of NA were reported). To analyze the mood 
changes in the two groups, a repeated-measures ANOVA for 
PA was computed, as well as a Friedman two-way ANOVA 
for NA, to account for the violated normality assumptions. 
For PA, the two groups (gelotophobia vs. no fear) differed, 
F(1, 48) = 9.82, p< .01, ηp2  = .17, with the gelotophobes 
being lower in PA than the no fear group. The interaction 
showed that the no fear group increased in PA, while the 
gelotophobes decreased, in line with H6, F(1, 48) = 6.48, p< 
.05, ηp2  = .12. The Friedman ANOVA with the Wilcoxon 
rank-order comparisons for NA showed a significant overall 
effect, χ2(df = 1) = 11.91, p< .001; NA differed from pre to 
post (T = 195.50, p< .05). Also, the two groups differed in the 
pre- and post-measures (U = 531.00, p< .05), but no interac-
tion occurred. As expected, looking at the photos did not lift 
PA of the gelotophobes, but lifted PA in no fear individuals 
(confirming H6). NA was higher in the gelotophobes to start 
with, but decreased from pre to post the rating task.
To test whether the increase in PA was mediated by the 
amount of facially expressed joy, a repeated-measures ANCOVA 
was computed for PA (with the frequency of expressed DDs as 
covariate). Results indicated that the frequency of expressed 
joy, indeed, mediated PA, as the significant results disap-
peared for the interaction of Gelotophobia group × 
Measurement time; main effect PA F(1, 47) = 0.18, p = .669, 
Measurement time × Gelotophobia group, F(1, 47) = 3.49, 
p = .068, Measurement time × Frequency DD, F(1, 47) = 
0.04, p = .949.
Discussion
As in Study 1, gelotophobes rated joy displays more con-
temptuous compared to the no fear group (in line with H1b). 
Both groups rated the contempt photos as contemptuous. 
Also, the contempt photos contained tendentially more per-
ceived joy for the gelotophobes than the no fear group (in 
line with H2b); though this finding needs to be treated with 
caution (i.e., failed to reach statistical significance in Study 1). 
Overall, the results for the emotion ratings were replicated in 
Study 2, but the findings were also extended to the effect of 
the rating task on the mood, as well as the spontaneous facial 
responses to the photos. Although the gelotophobes were 
habitually lower in PA and higher in NA compared to indi-
viduals with no fear (supporting the earlier findings of gelo-
tophobes being habitually lower in joy), these scores did not 
influence the ratings.
In line with the expectations, the gelotophobes expressed 
less joy smiles toward joy photos, compared to the no fear 
group (H3). This might be due to the elicitation of shame 
through (attributed) ridicule or contempt. According to 
Tomkins (1969), one of the facial response pattern in shame 
is the
 . . . frozen face, in which the entire facial musculature is kept 
under sufficient tight control, so that shame, along with all other 
affects is interfered with at the site of expressivity. This may be 
a chronic of a transient defense against shame and other affects. 
(p. 365)
The generally lower levels of facial responses are sup-
portive of Tomkins’s (1969) claim that individuals with an 
inclination to shame may display a “frozen face.” Perhaps 
the reduced facial expressivity of joy generalizes for geloto-
phobes over situations, in line with the findings of Papousek 
and colleagues (2009) who reported that gelotophobia pre-
dicted the control over the expression of emotions. 
Furthermore, the gelotophobes showed more contempt 
toward joy photos, compared to the no fear group (H4). This 
implies that they attribute negative emotions to facially dis-
played joy.
As laughter and smiling are known to be contagious (e.g., 
Bourgeois & Hess, 2008), it was expected that looking at the 
photos would induce state PA in participants with no fear. 
Indeed, the engagement with the smiling and laughter photos 
lifted the PA of participants with no fear, but did not lift the PA 
of the gelotophobes, confirming H6 and replicating the find-
ings of former studies (Ruch et al., 2009). The present study 
suggests that this effect is mediated through the expressed 
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enjoyment, as the mood changes differed when they were 
controlled for the frequency of expressed DDs. Likewise, a 
study by Papousek and colleagues (2009) showed that when 
gelotophobes are exposed to the affective states of others, 
they show less emotional contagion to cheerful stimuli but a 
high degree of contagion to negative stimuli, in line with the 
PA not increasing in the gelotophobia group. Moreover, dif-
ferences also occurred for NA: The gelotophobes’ NA was 
higher pre and post the rating task compared to individuals 
with no fear.
General Discussion
The aim of the present research was to investigate how gelo-
tophobia biases the perception of and responses to facially 
displayed joy and contempt. Gelotophobes perceive joy dis-
plays to contain more contempt compared with individuals 
with no fear (next to joy) and show more frequent contempt 
displays toward such displays than individuals with no fear 
of being laughed at. Also, gelotophobes express less joy 
toward joy displays and rate the joy lower compared with 
individuals with no fear. Next, we discuss the potential 
impact of those findings in the broader contexts of (a) the 
emotional experience of gelotophobes, (b) the potential 
impact of the bias on social interactions, (c) supporting evi-
dence for the bias from broad personality traits (extraversion 
and neuroticism), and (d) possible implications on well-
being and social support of the tendency of gelotophobes to 
express less joy compared with individuals with no fear.
First, the present findings lead to more insight into the 
emotional life of gelotophobes. While shame, fear, and (low) 
joy seem to be the emotions forming the core of the experi-
ence of fearful individuals (see Ruch et al., 2014), contempt 
seems to be the emotion assigned to the “offenders” (i.e., the 
persons smiling and laughing). This is in line with the 
descriptions of emotion clusters, which bring contempt, ridi-
cule, and shame together. The contemptuous person ridicules 
the person who is disliked, and the ridicule goes along with 
the laughter of the contemptuous person, which, in turn, elic-
its shame in the victim (e.g., Tomkins, 1969; “the laugh 
becomes a vehicle of contempt,” p. 367). Interestingly, 
Tomkins (1969) stated in his work on shame that this emotion 
might be accompanied by different expressive behaviors: “ . . 
. another specific anti-shame posture is the use of the con-
tempt response, either as a transient or chronic posture with 
which to combat one’s own readiness to feel ashamed” (p. 
365). This “anti-shame expression” in the form of contempt 
might explain the frequent occurrence of contempt expressed 
by gelotophobes and they might show contempt smiles to 
counteract the emergence and expression of shame (which 
they are very sensitive too). This is of particular importance, 
as the induction of shame might be due to a misinterpretation, 
as gelotophobes have been shown to misinterpret laughter-
related situations, auditory laughter, as well as ridicule and 
teasing situations (Ruch et al., 2014). Therefore, it might be 
that shame is induced in gelotophobes by making them feel 
ridiculed although no ridicule was intended. While different 
authors have stated that “mutual laughter” can release feel-
ings of shame by putting the shameful situation in perspec-
tive and find some irony in it (e.g., Retzinger, 1987), it is 
hypothesized from the current results that gelotophobes 
could not interpret these signals of mutual smiling and laugh-
ter as benevolent, as the effect of misjudgment is already 
apparent in context-free photos. Therefore, mutual laughter 
would not be perceived as relieving, as the underlying 
misperception is not solved (laughter is seen as a social rejec-
tion cue; see also Papousek et al., 2014). In this case, it would 
be necessary to train gelotophobes to re-evaluate laughter, its 
elicitors, and the underlying feeling state of the laughing per-
son first.
Second, the findings help generate new hypotheses on the 
difficulties gelotophobes experience in social interactions. 
Misperceiving joy as contemptuous and responding with 
more contempt, in general, might lead to a feedback loop of 
misunderstanding, as not only the gelotophobe will misper-
ceive the “offender” but also the “offender” will be signaled 
contempt on the behalf of the gelotophobe. This might leave 
both parties with perceived contempt of the other. Still, this 
might depend on relationship closeness too. Kashdan and 
Roberts (2006) showed that for highly socially anxious indi-
viduals, small talk interactions lead to greater NA compared 
with low socially anxious, whereas no difference was found 
for interactions in intimate relationships. This suggests that 
also for gelotophobes, intimacy might foster the mutual 
understanding of the partners and might help overcoming 
unusual responses.
Third, the present results lead to the hypothesis that gelo-
tophobes apply specific expressions when dealing with joy 
and contempt, by generally showing more contempt and less 
joy. This is also interesting in the context of the findings of 
Fok et al. (2008), as they reported that extraverts lessen the 
control over expressing happiness, but increase the control 
over disgust, surprise, and contempt. They argued that in dis-
tant relationship, the display of emotions that communicate 
discomfort or disapproval with the current situation may be 
perceived as impolite. Also, extraverts think that it is more 
appropriate to express contempt and disgust in close rela-
tionships, because they are more competent in their ability to 
repair and maintain relationships (e.g., Watson, Clark, 
McIntyre, & Hamaker, 1992). Gelotophobes generally report 
being (neurotic) introverts; therefore, the findings for intro-
version might also apply to gelotophobic individuals. 
Gelotophobes may lack competences to repair and maintain 
relationships, but at the same time express contempt more 
often toward joy and contempt than individuals without gel-
otophobia. This is likely to lead to misunderstandings in 
social interactions.
For introverts, Fok and colleagues (2008) stated that they are 
less socially responsive and less likely to modulate their emotion 
expression (even when uncomfortable with the public attention). 
This may partially explain the higher number of expressed con-
tempt in gelotophobes compared with individuals with no 
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fear. Still, in the present studies, participants were unob-
served and the results cannot solely be explained by these 
findings (unless the participants imagined a relationship with 
the individuals shown in the photos). Furthermore, geloto-
phobes also report higher scores in neuroticism than indi-
viduals with no fear (see Ruch et al., 2014, for a review). 
Kashdan (2002) showed that individuals high in neuroticism 
are more socially anxious and hypothesized that they would 
express their emotions less often to avoid unwelcome atten-
tion of others. For gelotophobes, this may be specific to 
avoiding the laughter of others.
Fourth, it has been postulated that genuine displays of 
positive emotions and mimicry elicit positive responses in 
other people, thus encouraging social affiliation, improving 
the quality of interactions, and making social resources avail-
able for coping with adversity (Fredrickson, 1998; Johnston 
et al., 2010; Papa & Bonanno, 2008). Furthermore, positive 
expressions are used on an everyday basis, for example, 
when individuals respond with polite smiles to social part-
ners, leading to advantages in cooperation and communica-
tion. If gelotophobes fail to mimic those expressions and 
empathize with their meaning, they will be likely to lose out 
on social reinforcement and cooperation, leading to less 
social affiliation and less social resources (as well as provid-
ing less of those resources to others). Consequently, the lack 
of social support might be a factor that makes gelotophobes 
even more vulnerable to misinterpreting people’s behavior 
and situations, as they get less help in re-evaluating situa-
tions, talking about experiences, and thereby less getting 
external validation on their (mis-)perceptions. Furthermore, 
DDs influence well-being by fostering self-regulation and 
helping reduce the physiological and emotional conse-
quences of NA (Fredrickson, 1998). This intrapersonal func-
tion of smiling will also receive less importance in 
gelotophobes as they generally display less joy facially.
The current study has several limitations. First and fore-
most, the stimuli utilized for the current investigation only 
included a small (and uneven) number of joy and contempt dis-
plays, as well as other smiles and posed expressions. The 
choice of displays was based on theoretical notions and their 
described putative facial expressions. Thus, the chosen dis-
plays were a good starting point to investigate individual differ-
ences in the perception of smiling and laughter, but further 
empirical validation of the smiles is needed. At best, an empiri-
cally validated classification of smiles and laughs would be used 
for such an investigation, but to date, no such classification is 
available. Also, the stimuli were not gender balanced. Thus, it 
was impossible to investigate effects of gender of the posing per-
son and other variables (such as attractiveness of the poser) on 
the perception of the displays. Although we assume that geloto-
phobia biases the smiling and laughter perception independent of 
the gender and attractiveness of the poser, future studies might 
investigate possible influential poser features. Furthermore, the 
small number of stimuli did not allow for a complete random-
ization of the stimuli. This might be relevant, as it has been 
shown that gelotophobes show overreactions to fear-inducing 
stimuli (see Ruch et al., 2014), and it is possible that seeing a 
joyful face at the beginning of the series induced NA, which 
was carried over to the subsequent photos. Thus, a replication 
of the results with more stimuli and a complete randomization 
would be necessary.
Second, the “Smiling Face May Hide an Evil Mind 
Paradigm” needs to be more closely evaluated, as the emotion 
ratings do not allow for a judgment of the underlying feeling 
state of the presenter, as participants were explicitly asked to 
rate the facial displays. At best, the paradigm would be uti-
lized with additional questions. Third, it is still unanswered 
whether gelotophobes misperceive joyful and contemptuous 
faces because of certain features of the displays. Therefore, 
features making smiles and laughs malicious need to be 
investigated by specifically asking participants what made 
the display contemptuous. Fourth, while the study by Ruch et 
al. (2009) focused on auditory presentation, this study has 
focused on visual presentation. Future studies should com-
bine the two modes and investigate the differential effects of 
both, as well as their combination. Furthermore, physiologi-
cal measures, that is, of tension could give further indications 
on the gelotophobes’ responses to these displays. This might 
help shed light on the question why gelotophobes are prone to 
believing that “a joyful face may hide an evil mind.”
To conclude, this is the first study investigating geloto-
phobia and emotions assigned to potential “offenders” dis-
playing smiling and laughter. Although these results need 
further specification and replication, they might give an 
insight into why gelotophobes find dealing with smiling and 
laughter aversive (as they see them as rather contemptuous 
and less joyful compared with individuals with no fear). It is 
important to investigate and understand such mechanisms, as 
the expression of smiling and laughter serves important 
social functions beyond the communication of positive emo-
tions. Also, the expression of contempt has an important pre-
diction value in relationship processes (see Gottman, 
Levenson, & Woodin, 2001). If gelotophobes misperceive 
displays of joy and contempt, they may experience difficul-
ties in social interactions and it needs to be assessed how this 
misperception can be addressed in training programs, maybe 
by applying cognitive reattribution strategies.
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Notes
1. Based on the works of Bänninger-Huber (1996) and Ekman 
(1985), we utilized smile types with explicit descriptions of 
their putative facial expressions in Action Unit (AU) codes (in 
the Facial Action Coding System, FACS; Ekman, Friesen, & 
Hager, 2002). Joy smile, Duchenne display (DD): symmetric 
contraction of the zygomatic major muscle (AU12) and the 
outer part of the orbicularis oculi muscle (AU6). The DD 
has been related to the experience of joy, amusement, and 
the funniness of jokes (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; 
Messinger, Cassel, Acosta, Ambadar, & Cohn, 2008; Ruch, 
2005). The Duchenne laugh consists of an open-mouth DD 
plus an audible, laughter-related vocalization (Ruch & Ekman, 
2001). Contempt smile: unilateral action of the buccinator 
muscle (AU14; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Matsumoto, 2004). 
Although the universality of the contempt expression has been 
questioned (e.g., Russell, 1991; Wagner, 2000), there is a body 
of research suggesting that it is universally recognized (e.g., 
Keltner & Haidt, 1999), though not always correctly verbally 
labeled (see Rosenberg & Ekman, 1995). Phony smile: sole 
contraction of AU12 (Ekman, 1985). Masking smiles (actually 
a family of smiles): the combination of markers of negative 
emotions and AU12 (Ekman, 1985; Ekman & Friesen, 1982). 
Chaplin smile: sharp upward pulling of the lips due to the con-
traction of the caninus muscle (AU13).
2. Although comprehensive validations of smiling and laughter 
classifications are still outstanding, smiling and laughter types 
have been described according to their facial expression, offer-
ing a starting point to investigate the influence of gelotophobia 
on smiling and laughter perception.
3. AU1 = Inner Brow Raiser. AU2 = Outer Brow Raiser. AU4 = 
Brow Lowerer. AU5 = Upper Lid Raiser. AU6 = Cheek Raiser. 
AU7 = Lids Tight. AU9 = Nose Wrinkle. AU12 = Lip Corner 
Puller. AU14 = Dimpler. AU17 = Chin Raiser. AU20 = Lip 
Stretch. AU24 = Lip Presser. AU25 = Lips Part. AU26 = Jaw 
Drop. L, R = left, right side of the face.
4. Analyses of the distractor items indicated no differences between 
individuals with or without gelotophobia (all ns), or interaction 
between the Emotion ratings × Gelotophobia group, in line with 
our predictions (all ns). The surprise photo obtained highest rat-
ings on surprise, which was rated more intense than all other 
emotions (p< .001). The happy–surprise emotion blend was 
rated most intensely as joyful and surprise, which did not differ 
from each other but from all other emotion ratings (p< .001). 
For the onset of fear, the ratings above the cut-off did not differ 
(p = .055). For the concentration, the highest ratings (anger, con-
tempt) did not differ from each other but from all other emotions 
(p< .001). For the neutral photos, a repeated-measures ANOVA 
showed that the emotion ratings differed, F
emotion
(2, 148) = 30.08, 
p< .001, ηp2  = .29: Highest ratings were obtained in sadness (no 
fear group: M = 2.63, SD = 1.55; gelotophobes: M = 2.63, SD 
= 1.56), followed by contempt (no fear group: M = 2.38, SD = 
1.67; gelotophobes: M = 2.60, SD = 1.73) and finally fear (no 
fear group: M = 2.22, SD = 1.39; gelotophobes: M = 2.32, SD 
= 1.21), F
contrasts
(1, 74) > 13.65, p< .001, ηp2 > .16. The groups 
(fear, no fear) did not differ, F(1, 80) = 0.01, p = .914, and no 
interaction occurred, F(3, 240) = 0.21, p = .909.
5. Repeating the analyses by controlling for positive affect (PA) 
and negative affect (NA) in a repeated-measures ANCOVA 
(gelotophobia group as a factor, the emotion ratings as repeated 
measures, intensity of emotion as a dependent variable, and PA 
and NA as covariates) showed that neither trait had a significant 
influence on the ratings (p = .132 and p = .274, respectively).
6. Too little masking smiles occurred for statistical analyses.
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